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Abstract: 
This essay critically engages the concept of transcendence in Charles Taylor's A Secular Age. I 
explore his definition of transcendence, its role in holding a modernity-inspired nihilism at bay, 
and how it is crucial to the Christian antihumanist argument that he makes. In the process, I show 
how the critical power of this analysis depends heavily and paradoxically on the Nietzschean 
antihumanism that he otherwise rejects. Through an account of what I describe as naturalistic 
Christianity, I argue that transcendence need not be construed as supernatural, that all of the 
resources necessary for a meaningful life are immanent in the natural process, which includes the 
semiotic capacities of Homo sapiens. Finally, I triangulate Taylor's supernatural account of 
transcendence, naturalistic Christianity, and Dreyfus and Kelly's physis-based account of “going 
beyond” our normal normality in All Things Shining: Reading the Western Classics for Meaning 
in a Secular Age. 
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1. Introduction 
The title of my paper is something of a misnomer insofar as it implies a comprehensive critique 
of Taylor's magnum opus. My actual ambition, which is much less expansive, is to pull on a 
particular thread in Taylor's complex argument. Given the immense analytical ambition, 
historical scope, erudition, and moral seriousness of Taylor's text, I shall be hard pressed to do 
even this. An additional purpose is to provide a preliminary outline of a “naturalistic Christian 
ethic” where Christianity is merely one response among many to the ontological question, “Why 
is there something rather than nothing?” and a response to the ethical question, “How should I 
live?” Most important, perhaps, it is one expression among many of the often unarticulated 
desire to be captured, swept up, and carried away—to become “other.” Thus we have the 
theoretical, practical, and ecstatic dimensions of religion. On this thoroughly anthropological 
view, humans create religions just as surely as spiders spin webs, bees make honey, and birds 
build nest. The cultural-performative-semiotic activity of religion-making is no less natural. 
I should say at the outset that the broad outline of Taylor's argument is persuasive. But as that 
well-worn cliché would have it, God and the Devil are in the details. There is a particular detail, 
actually an ensemble of ideas that merit special attention: Taylor's account of transcendence as 
a superhuman phenomenon; his claims regarding its relation to the spiritual or ethical life; and 
the invidious distinction he makes among “orthodox” Christian ethics, the ethics of secular 
humanism, and various middling positions that include neo-Nietzschean antihumanism and, 
presumably, my own naturalistic Christianity. Taylor assumes that a “fully” significant life 
cannot be lived without transcendence whose meaning must resemble the “orthodox” Christian 
notion. I place the term “orthodox” in scare quotes to signal Taylor's use of an ideological term 
for which he does not make an argument. Perhaps what I should say is that the argument does 
not persuade me. In any event, Taylor clearly defines orthodox Christianity. He refers to the 
broad trajectory of Western Christianity from the church councils of late antiquity through the 
split-off of the Eastern Orthodox Church to what, post-Reformation, we call Roman Catholicism. 
This is not to say that Protestantism is not part of the team, but it is clearly a second-string player 
(within the Christian fold but deficient because of its complicities with a secularizing modernity). 
This is especially true of its most liberal forms. Meanwhile “Oriental Christianity,” dissident, and 
eccentric forms of Christianity—such as the naturalistic Christianity that I shall describe more 
fully later—are simply excluded from his account. But this is not where I wish to place my 
argumentative energies. Rather, I wish to contest Taylor's account of transcendence, which is 
part of my critique of what Taylor calls the “immanent frame” of the secular age. All of this is 
constitutive of an alternative account of spiritual life (religious, aesthetic, and ethical), and 
provides a different answer to the question, “How should I live?” This alternative avoids the 
materialistic reductions and fake heroism that Taylor criticizes without adopting his account of 
transcendence. 
2. Transcending Transcendence 
Taylor is a “catholic” thinker in both the general and specific sense of that term. A Secular Age is 
a fascinating inquiry into the Christian foundations of Western ethics. He provides a strong 
reading of the virtues of the Christian ethic as such without ignoring the diversity of Christian 
practice or denying the historical evils, the violence and exclusion, associated with it. 
Specifically, Taylor reasserts the foundational and fundamental importance of Christian ethics in 
a distinctively secular age: a period in which the default position, at least among intellectual 
elites, is nonbelief. Why, he asks, is it so difficult now, in the year 2000, to believe in 
transcendent realities (Plato's Forms or the Christian God) when in the sixteenth century it was 
hard not to believe? His answer is complex, distinguishing among three kinds of secularism. 
Secularity 1 is the exclusion of God from the proverbial public square, from government, 
schools, and so on. Secularity 2 consists of the deterioration of religious belief and practice, 
exemplified by declining church attendance. Secularity 3 refers to “the possibility or 
impossibility of certain kinds of experience in our age,” that is, the very conditions of belief are 
now defined by circumstances that make belief in transcendence very difficult (Taylor 2007, 2, 
14). Echoing Alasdair McIntyre (1981) but without the same sense of a post-Christian moral 
apocalypse, Taylor claims that the differences in the lifeworlds of sixteenth-century Europe and 
the contemporary West are radically different, supporting and undermining different (naïve 
versus reflective) kinds of religious experience. Where a Christian construal of things was once 
obvious if not “necessary,” a corporate and theopolitical matter of life and death, it is now a low-
intensity choice, an object of market-style consumerism, one “shiny” option among many. An 
immanent frame of thought is now the taken-for-granted reality for believers and nonbelievers 
alike. In the secular age, a naïve1 belief in transcendence has become exceptional if not 
exceptionally difficult (Taylor, 12). 
More important, and I think controversial, is Taylor's claim that secularity 3 constricts our vision 
in such a way that “spiritual mediocrity” becomes our dominant existential possibility. Taylor 
does not use the term spiritual mediocrity; he speaks, rather, of a declining sense of “fullness,” 
an experience of plenitude or “presence” that reorients by disorienting, which disrupts our 
average, middling, common denominator, mediocre, and normalizing normality. Early in the 
book he remarks: 
I want to talk about belief and unbelief, not as rival theories, that is, ways that people 
account for existence or morality, whether by God or by something in nature, or 
whatever. Rather what I want to do is focus on the different kinds of lived experience 
involved in understanding your life in one way or the other, on what it is like to live as a 
believer or an unbeliever [Taylor, 4]. 
Thus Taylor takes his notion of “fullness,” which is practical-and-existential in orientation, as 
cutting across belief (“theistic” or otherwise) and “naturalism” construed as unbelief. The scare 
quotes signal the fact that there are versions of theism and naturalism (for example, panentheism 
and pragmatic naturalism) that deny the God-nature distinction that Taylor assumes, albeit in 
different ways, to different degrees, and from opposing ends of the duality. But I digress. The 
point I wish to establish is that Taylor associates the sense of fullness with various forms of 
existential depth captured by the question “How should I live? His answer involves 
acknowledging or serving a good that is independent of human flourishing (Taylor, 16). Taylor 
remarks: 
In both Buddhism and Christianity, there is something similar in spite of the great 
difference in doctrine. This is that the believer or devout person is called on to make a 
profound inner break with the goals of flourishing in their own case; they are called on, 
that is, to detach themselves from their own flourishing, to the point of the extinction of 
self in one case, or to that of renunciation of human fulfillment to serve God in the other. 
The respective patterns are clearly visible in the exemplary figures. The Buddha achieves 
Enlightenment; Christ consents to a degrading death to follow his father's will [Taylor, 
17]. 
Neither Taylor nor I are Buddhist scholars. We are informed, nonexpert readers who understand 
Buddhism differently. I do not believe that Buddhism does the support work; the comparative, 
de-parochializing work that he wishes it to do. As I understand it, the basic point of the Buddhist 
notion of anatman, no permanent self or eternal soul, is not detachment from human flourishing 
but from delusions regarding its nature. All forms of being within the wheel of existence are 
unsatisfactory. All sentient beings, including the gods suffer. However, only those reborn as 
humans can attain enlightenment. Though it has compassionate ramifications for all beings, 
enlightenment is human-centered. If we disassociate the term from its Western specificity, 
especially the “bad” connotation of exclusivity, and the debased if not sinister connotations 
derived from Heidegger (1977), then we might say that Buddhism is humanism. Speaking of 
Christianity, Taylor asserts that “flourishing is good, nevertheless seeking it is not our ultimate 
goal” (Taylor, 18). He acknowledges that he is not sure whether this tension between the good of 
flourishing and the goodness of an ultimate goal that is independent of the human good is present 
in Buddhism. We appreciate his honesty. As I understand it, enlightenment (becoming fully 
awake) is not a good that is independent of human flourishing. It is precisely what human 
flourishing is, what we come to recognize it to be, when we attain true wisdom and insight 
(prajñā) and see things as they really are. Enlightened human flourishing is not exclusive or 
independent of the flourishing of other sentient beings (so to say that Buddhism is a kind of 
humanism is not to say that it is indifferent to other beings—flourishing is interdependent). 
Within the context of Taylor's ostensibly comparative account, I question the very notion of 
“fullness.” It sounds peculiar in a tradition where absence rather than presence, the “lack” of 
inherent, eternal existence, if not reality is a basic doctrine.2 Taylor appears to see Buddhism 
through his own misprision; that is, he mistakenly takes Buddhism to be like Christianity 
regarding issues of fullness and lack. 
Were Taylor to concede my point, then he might reassert his Christian-specific claim without the 
“comparative cover” that he hoped Buddhism would provide. In this case, he would forthrightly 
assert the superiority of Christianity on the question of fullness. Though he is coy on this point, it 
appears to be the claim that he wishes to make and in fact does make implicitly. Though he does 
not provide a definitive argument, Taylor doubts the possibility of a proper understanding of 
morality and ethical life within a naturalistic ontology. He doubts whether it “can make sense of 
the phenomenology of universalism, the sense of a breaking out of an earlier space and acceding 
to a higher one” (Taylor, 609). Such a breakthrough from normal and ordinary (lower) space to 
extraordinary (higher) space is Taylor's characterization of transcendence. This higher space is 
transformative, entailing a radical “reeducation of desire,” a fundamental reorientation of one's 
life. Though he expresses doubts about the adequacy of Humean naturalism, I suspect that his 
objection is to naturalism as such—that is, naturalism per se is defective. I have no desire to 
rescue Humean naturalism, though I do not find it nearly as objectionable as he does. But I 
should add that Taylor's reductive account of naturalism is not the only account. 
Taylor sets up his argument in reference to believers and unbelievers. “Believers” refers to all 
subjects of “orthodox” and “traditional” religion—including Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and 
Buddhists—but, preeminently, to Christians. Within the category of unbelievers, he distinguishes 
among inclusive humanists, exclusive humanists, and neo-Nietzschean antihumanists. The bulk 
of his argument is directed against exclusive humanism of which much of the book is a long 
“Nietzschean” genealogy. In debunking this kind of humanism, he shows how it disenchants and 
flattens human life, draining any element of the sublime and the tragic, while coloring everything 
gray. In contrast, the only thing Taylor says about inclusive humanism is its vague openness to 
transcendence; meanwhile, neo-Nietzschean antihumanism accents the tragic, heroic, and 
sublime dimension of human existence that it accuses Christianity and humanism of extirpating. 
Taylor seems to acknowledge that neo-Nietzschean antihumanism has a conception of 
transcendence. But it is clearly an inferior kind insofar as it does not have a superhuman referent 
(something that is nature-transcendent) of the Christian or Platonic kind. Taylor focuses on the 
extreme positions—traditional, unreconstructed, orthodox Christianity, on the one side and 
exclusive humanism, on the other—that he persuasively argues define the middling alternatives. 
By doing so, however, he fails to acknowledge intermundane, “this-worldly,” and naturalistic 
forms of transcendence. As I construe it, “naturalism” is neither “naïve” nor innocent of 
“construction.” It is a metaphysically laden category that describes everything that is and the 
“appearance” of everything that is: both ontic and ontological, nature naturing and nature 
natured, that is, nature doing what it does and everything that follows that agency. On this view, 
no one quite knows what nature can do. The “self-surpassing” capacities of nature continually 
surprise, mystify, and enchant. Nature is “magical.” 
3. Secular Age Dilemmas 
Taylor's description is complicated and resists a simple linear account. So my approach in this 
section will be somewhat elliptical as I take several passes at the dilemmas of the modern secular 
age that Taylor describes. Even though he writes about the “immanent frame” of the secular age 
that “enframes”3 the world of post-Enlightenment modernity, Taylor is concerned in the first 
insistence with its effects on Christianity. This concern is on display when he addresses “the case 
against Christianity,” specifically the humanist and antihumanist claim that it rejects or impedes 
human fulfillment. Noting the paradoxical, bi-directional nature of the charge, he remarks: 
On the one hand, religion actuated by pride or fear sets impossibly high goals for 
humans, of asceticism, or mortification, or renunciation of ordinary human ends. It 
invites us to “transcend humanity”, and this cannot but end up mutilating us; it leads us to 
despise and neglect the ordinary fulfillment and happiness which is within our 
reach. . . . On the other hand, the reproach is leveled that religion cannot face the real 
hard facts about human nature and human life: that we are imperfect beings, the product 
of evolution, with a lot of aggression and conflict built into our natures; that there is also 
much which is horrible and terrible in human life which can't just be wished away. 
Religion tends to bowdlerize reality [Taylor, 623–24]. 
While Nietzsche did not invent this critique, he certainly stereotypes it. He uses metaphors such 
“castration” and “domestication” to describe the Platonic, Christian, and humanist approaches to 
human desire: the will-to-power, the wild and untamed, violent and sexy, dimensions of human 
being (Nietzsche 1990, 52, 53; 1994, 91–94, 98). He contrasts the freedom and health of wild 
animals and the sickness of domesticated animals. (Zoo animals seem to be an anomalous 
intermediate category, much like criminals whom Nietzsche describes as strong types who have 
been made sick.) Docile and decadent, the wild nature of domesticated animals has been bred out 
of them, if not literally castrated. Taylor uses “mutilation”—think male and female genital 
mutilation—to capture the spirit of Nietzsche's critique. To be a subject of the secular age is to 
be in the crosshairs of Nietzsche's critique of Christian and humanistic decadence. 
So Taylor does not believe that the two-horned dilemma described in the previous block quote—
the mortification of ordinary desires, on the one horn and the denial of hard realities, on the 
other—is exclusively Christian. On the contrary, Christians, secular humanists, and 
antihumanists face a common dilemma that characterizes the secular age as such, cutting across 
distinctions between believer and nonbeliever, and among Christian, humanist, and antihumanist. 
These dilemmas have much to do with the maximal demand for “fullness” that spiritual life—
aesthetic, ethical, and religious—presents to its subjects. He captures the meaning of “maximal 
demand” in the following question: “how to define our highest spiritual or moral aspirations for 
human beings while showing a path to the transformation involved which does not crush, 
mutilate or deny what is essential to our humanity?” (Taylor, 639–40). If believers (Christian and 
otherwise) and nonbelievers (humanist and antihumanist) are constrained by the central dilemma 
of the secular age, then 
[w]e have to face the possibility that . . . squaring our highest aspirations with an integral 
respect for the full range of human fulfillments may be a mission impossible. That, in 
other words, we either have to scale down our moral aspirations in order to allow our 
ordinary life to flourish; or we have to agree to sacrifice some of this ordinary flourishing 
to secure our higher goals. If we think of this as a dilemma, then perhaps we have to 
impale ourselves on one horn or the other [Taylor, 640]. 
In light of this account, Taylor construes the exclusive form of secular humanism as a dual 
failure. Gored by both horns of the dilemma, its proponents set their sights too low (bowdlerizing 
the maximal demand) and simultaneously minimize the costs of suppressing the sublime (erotic 
and violent) side of human nature. Thus they mortify ordinary human life, subjecting it to the 
impossibly high demands of the heroic life. On the one hand, they make a virtue of a necessity, 
baptizing Zarathustra's “last men” as if they were supermen. On the other hand, they crush 
ordinary human desires with the same ruthlessness they attribute to Christianity. So Christians, 
humanists, and (as we shall see) neo-Nietzscheans are equally “on all fours” where this dilemma 
is concerned. As if to accentuate this point, Taylor remarks that the radical transfiguring of “even 
the most purblind, self-absorbed and violent” people to which Christianity aspires will only 
arrive when the Kingdom of God comes. Until the eschaton, the fact that one has evaded the 
horns of the dilemma and met the maximal demand is a matter of faith and the faithful 
prefiguring of the kingdom within exemplary communities and lives. 
If exclusive humanism is doubly inadequate because it bowdlerizes and mortifies ordinary 
human desires and notions of flourishing, then neo-Nietzschean antihumanism is one-sided. 
Setting its sights incredibly high—transcending quotidian humanity, accenting a superhuman 
notion of heroism—antihumanism is dripping with contempt for the ordinary. Its notion of 
transcendence costs ordinary people, the vast majority of us, “the herd,” quite dearly. Here 
mortification is instrumental to the flourishing of “higher types,” ordinary people be damned. 
There is something interesting and perhaps revealing in Taylor's argument. The neo-Nietzschean 
argument appears to do most of the critical work: both identifying the existential issues that are 
at stake in modernity and providing a critique of secular humanism. Taylor's use of this 
perspective as the spear tip of his critique reminds one of Alasdair McIntyre (1991). McIntyre 
uses the Nietzschean-Foucauldian genealogist to undermine Enlightenment models of moral 
inquiry and clear discursive ground for his preferred tradition-based model. In addition, one is 
reminded of John Milbank's (1990) use of the antihumanism of French poststructuralism for 
similar purposes—that is, pro-tradition, “radically orthodox,” anti-Enlightenment. As with those 
texts, Taylor's Christian critique seems oddly dependent on the critical power of the anti-
Christian Nietzschean perspective. 
Whatever we make of this oddity, it is here, when speaking of the antihumanist option, that we 
see a certain slippage and ambiguity in Taylor's use of the term “transcendence.” Though he 
acknowledges the complexity of the concept and how easily it supports non-edifying forms of 
argument, he constantly conflates transcendence as going beyond human flourishing and 
transcendence as going beyond ordinary, commonly accepted forms of human flourishing. This 
conflation is essential, I think, to the invidious distinction he wishes to make between post-Axial 
Age theistic notions of transcendence (especially Christian ones) and naturalistic notions of 
transcendence. Naturalistic transcendence is the notion that immanence has innate powers 
of self-overcoming, which entails going beyond the normal space and time of quotidian 
experiences. Immanence is inherently uncanny and magical. Taylor claims that the proponents of 
immanence cannot consistently make the distinctions that “we” wish to make and, thus, cannot 
properly motivate ethical life. I am suspicious of this conflation. It makes me wonder whether he 
is more sympathetic to the traditional view than he claims. Despite his claims to the contrary, 
Taylor appears to be exposing his own anxieties when, regarding the traditional view, he 
remarks: “The denial of transcendence is bound to lead to a crumbling and eventual break-down 
of all moral standards. First, secular humanism and then eventually its pieties come under 
challenge. And in the end nihilism” (Taylor, 637). Careful, often compelling, and always 
provocative, Taylor does not make this argument explicitly. However, he dances around if not to 
the threshold of this traditional claim; the gestalt, Eros, and overall thrust of his analysis are in 
the spirit of the traditionalists while avoiding their specific claims. 
Taylor is not content to leave matters here. He wants to makes an affirmative argument—even if 
oblique, faith-based, tentative, and elliptical—about the superior capacity of Christianity to meet 
the maximal demand. As a preface to that argument, he nuances his position by identifying four 
possible subject positions in a secular age: secular humanism, neo-Nietzschean (antihumanism), 
and two kinds of believers in transcendence. The first category of transcendence believers 
includes “reactionaries” who wish to return to the “naïve” religious status quo of “orthodox” 
Christianity before the emergence of deism, the older cousin of secular humanism. (The subjects 
of this view are those we encountered in the previous paragraph who claim that denying 
transcendence leads to nihilism.) The second category of transcendence believers includes “anti-
reactionaries” such as Taylor himself, who, as an eminent Hegelian scholar (Taylor 1975), 
provides a quasi-Hegelian description of this subject position. In an effort to channel this 
Hegelian spirit, I call Taylor's position “reflected traditionalism.” Reflective traditionalists 
(whose views remind one, in some respects, of the positions staked out by the Anglican tradition 
of radical orthodoxy) 
think that the practical primacy of life has been a great gain for human kind, and that 
there is some truth in the self-narrative of the Enlightenment: this gain was in fact 
unlikely to come about without some breach with established religion. (We might even be 
tempted to say that modern unbelief is providential, but that might be a provocative way 
of putting it.) But we nevertheless think that the metaphysical primacy of life espoused 
by exclusive humanism is wrong, and stifling, and that its continued dominance puts in 
danger the practical primacy [Taylor 2007, 637]. 
Taylor identifies three misprisions—that is, misinterpretations of the Christian tradition, and 
even gross distortions—that inhibit evidence-based arguments for Christianity's superiority in 
meeting the maximal demand for existential fullness. Again, what this demand entails is the 
pursuit of our highest spiritual aspirations, fully aware of the difficult transformations required, 
while resisting the ascetic, sacrificial urge to mutilate essential parts of ourselves. These 
misprisions are distorted notions of transcendence, sacrifice, and of the relations between “good” 
and “bad” passions (Taylor, 643–46). As Taylor remarks, disentangling the virtues of these 
categories from their vices is a difficult undertaking. In contrast to merely adopting a 
propositional attitude, there is no way of living our aspirations without loss. Some things will not 
survive the process of transformation; nor should they. But how to distinguish what is essential, 
what we should continue to value through and beyond transformation, what should be left 
unscathed, from those things we should let go? In short, what is and what is not well lost? Taylor 
does not believe that there is a clear, non-faith-based answer. But on his faith-full reading, the 
superiority of the Christian response is apparent. 
Against the “Platonizing error” of construing bodily desires as inessential and not worthy of 
survival post-transformation, Taylor counterpoises Christian agape that renders ego-boosting 
satisfactions irrelevant (albeit in eschatological time), and that is “bound up with a compassion 
which is itself incarnate as bodily desire” (Taylor, 644). In short, Christianity preserves the body, 
which Platonism incorrectly thinks is something that is well lost. Against Platonic and Stoic 
notions of sacrifice, Christian notions when freed from the distortions, affirm the value of what is 
sacrificed. There is no “sour grapes” disposition toward what is sloughed off, as if it does not 
really matter, and we really did not want it. As if the Christian with regenerated eyes now sees 
that what she valued before her act of sacrifice had no value worth preserving. Such an approach 
to renunciation, to the objects forgone “makes nonsense of the sacrifice of Christ.” Taylor argues 
that Christian renunciation is not a negative judgment of human fulfillment. The fact that 
unbelieving critics and much of conservative Christianity reads renunciation in this manner is 
evidence of the power of this distortion of sacrifice. Finally, against the “most reductive 
Enlightenment theories” that call for an extirpation of vice so that virtue may flourish, Taylor 
cites a Biblical perspective where “the wheat [virtues] and the tares [vices] are so inextricably 
interwoven that the latter cannot be ripped out without also damaging the former” (Taylor, 646). 
Presumably, Taylor knows that this answer is not sufficient as it stands. Even if we discount 
René Girard's claim that “[v]iolence is the heart and secret soul of the sacred” (Girard 1977, 31), 
religion does in fact inspire violence. Religion is a house of violence: both shelter for and 
quarantine against (Girard, 24). As Taylor acknowledges (Taylor 2007, 674) and as others have 
shown in spectacular fashion (Carrasco 2000), blood sacrifice, including human sacrifice, is a 
primordial and persistent expression of homo religiosus. He recognizes the cathartic and sexy 
allure of violence (Bataille 1992), the terrible love of war—whether on a battle field or a football 
field (Hillman 2004)—and that the violence of war is “the force which gives us meaning” 
(Hedges 2002). However, he traces a history of “reformation” from Judaism through Christianity 
in which efforts to tame violence, without mutilating those aspects of human nature to which it is 
bound up like wheat and weeds, have been fruitful. As if to forestall critiques from those readers 
who would find this to be too optimistic an interpretation, Taylor claims that Christianity 
provides a metabiological account of the human propensity to violence, namely, the concept of 
sin that appears to be truer to the evidence of human behavior and nature than secular humanist 
accounts are. 
Taylor's metabiological account never quite takes off. Or differently put, his Christianity-based 
account of the human propensity to violence does not do the explanatory and persuasive work 
that he wants it to. It dies the death of the many qualifications that Taylor as a careful scholar 
feels obligated to make. Taylor's hope was that the Christian account could both explain the 
allure of violence and provide a “redefinition or transformation” that carried us beyond it. To the 
question “does Christianity take us out of the space of dilemmas that exclusive humanism seems 
unable to escape?” he had hope to answer “yes.” But the mysteriousness of the transformation 
required, the ambiguity of the evidence, the interpretation of which is mediated by a particular 
kind of Christian faith, means that “the answer could also be no” (Taylor, 673). Taylor's honesty 
even in face of great desire for a different answer leads him to this conclusion. He remarks: 
Both sides need a good dose of humility, that is, realism. If the encounter between faith 
and humanism is carried through in this spirit, we find that both sides are fragilized; and 
the issue is rather reshaped in a new form: not who has the final decisive argument in its 
armory—must Christianity crush human flourishing? Must unbelief degrade human life? 
Rather, it appears as a matter of who can respond most profoundly and convincingly to 
what are ultimately commonly felt dilemmas [Taylor, 675]. 
Taylor is skeptical of secular responses. Underlying his question—“Can the values we take as 
binding really be invented?” (Taylor, 589)—is a fear of nihilism, even if his understanding is 
“reflected” rather than traditional. Thus his claim that a fully human life must be oriented toward 
something that transcends human life, that is independent, external, superhuman, and even 
antihuman. For Taylor that reality is theChristian god. This is true despite his use of Plato's 
Forms as argumentative scaffolding and of Buddhism as a kind of comparative, de-
parochializing cover for his parochial argument.4 Short of this kind of transcendence, his theistic 
hunches tell him, a properly understood and motivated ethical life is unlikely. Rather than say 
that his hunches are false (can we know such things definitively?), I will say that 
myanthropological hunches tell me something quite different. In the next section, I describe a 
way of being that is neither theistic nor atheistic, whose subjects are neither secular humanists, 
nor neo-Nietzschean antihumanists, nor believers in transcendence as Taylor construes it. I 
contend that this way of living adequately accounts for the aesthetic, ethical, and religious life—
that is, the existential depth dimension, the doings and sufferings of spiritual life, without the 
transcendental anchor that Taylor deems necessary. 
4. Toward a Naturalistic Christian Ethic 
Metaphysically speaking, I subscribe to the claim that “nature is all there is.” In the first instance, 
nature is simply another way of saying “all that is.” This should not be confused with the claim 
that scientific accounts capture everything that nature is and that needs to be said. Though the 
sciences have been very successful in telling us what nature is and have earned a privileged place 
in any account, cultural phenomena, especially aesthetics and ethics, elude their non-trivial 
grasp. Nonscientific accounts of various kinds are superior and essential. How the “global” 
conception of nature articulates with “regional” conceptions, scientific or otherwise, is not a 
matter I will address. However, I do acknowledge that more needs to be said. 
With this overture in place, I can say that naturalistic Christianity is the view there is no 
transcendent, holy, or sacred object of devotion independent of nature. The ontology of sacred 
realities is the human imagination, which is underwritten by the “semiotic sociality” of the 
species. On this view, Christianity is among a handful of great wisdom traditions5 that offer 
comprehensive and highly influential accounts of how we should live. Since the Axial Age, these 
traditions have captured the imagination and loyalty of billions of people, and have come to 
define in large part though not exclusively what we mean by religion. I contend that naturalistic 
Christians need not accept Taylor's account of transcendence as something that breaks into 
immanence. Indeed, we need not accept the immanence-transcendence duality at all. Immanence 
and transcendence are human constructions or modalities of the natural process. That we do not 
accept Taylor's account does not require us to embrace the mechanistic, selfish-gene, reductive 
versions of scientific naturalism (Patricia Churchland 1986; Dennett 1991, 1995; Dawkins1976, 
1996, 2005; and Paul Churchland 1995), which are the conjoined twin of Taylor's “exclusive 
humanism.”6 Naturalistic Christianity is a variant of what I have elsewhere described as 
pragmatic religious naturalism (Hart 1998, 2000). Other versions include Henry Samuel 
Levinson's “festive American Jewish naturalism” (Davaney and Frisina 2006, 115). 
If religious narratives and disciplines can be understood naturalistically without obliterating their 
particularity or the difference they make in people's lives (Levinson 1992, 7), then we might 
describe such religion as “disillusioned.” The discipline of disillusionment goes hand in glove 
with George Santayana's “wistful materialism” that he distinguishes, according to Levinson, 
from metaphysical idealism and skepticism (Levinson, 7). The wistful materialist denies the 
necessity of a transcendental turn for critical thinking. To William James's question of what 
makes life worth living, the wistful materialist answers: look no further than matter and history. 
On Santayana's view as explicated by Levinson, “We can account naturalistically—materially 
and historically—for parts of spiritual life that matter to us, even though spiritual life has 
traditionally (and mistakenly) depended on a supernatural or metaphysical explanation” 
(Levinson, 73). 
I share this wistful, nonreductive view as far as it goes. But it does not go far enough. Like 
Santayana and Levinson, I do not choose between the reality of physical things and nonphysical 
things such as minds, aesthetics, and ethics. However, they do not provide a causal account of 
how brains produce consciousness and minds. The relationship between minds and brains is 
controversial. On the one side is the argument that naturalism is deficient insofar as experience 
(sentience, consciousness, and mind) is not a constitutive aspect of matter. Some argue that 
consciousness is just as fundamental as matter. We need to adjust our physics to properly 
account for it (Chalmers 1996, 4, 126, 214, 297). Others claim that experience is not an emergent 
and secondary expression of matter but an intrinsic property. They see accounts of mind in terms 
of “emergence” as magical thinking. On this panprotoexperiential7 view, feeling, consciousness, 
mind, and “spirit” are the evolutionary developments of experiential precursors in matter and 
energy (Whitehead 1978; Griffin 2001). Indeed, there is an element of this kind of thinking 
(James 1983) in the tradition of pragmatic naturalism. Or consider Charles Sanders Peirce. 
“Peirce believed that mentality in the form of feeling, effort (or the category of Secondness), and 
habit (Thirdness) to be present at the beginning of evolution and in the fundamental elements of 
nature, which he regarded, along with nineteenth century physicists, to be atoms” (Clarke 2007, 
39). James remarks: “If evolution is to work smoothly, consciousness in some shape must have 
been present at the very origin of things” (1983, 152).8 On the other side—I take Owen Flanagan 
(1991, 1992, 2000, 2002) as an influential representative—is the view that a materialist and non-
magical account of consciousness and mind is precisely what contemporary brain science 
provides. I find myself vacillating between these perspectives. Every time I think that I have 
settled on one of them, I read something that unsettles me. So I vacillate. 
This vacillation notwithstanding, naturalistic Christianity is a religious perspective that has been 
subjected to the discipline of dis-illusionment (not to be confused with disenchantment) that 
modern/postmodern knowledges, especially science, have wrought. Drawing on Santayana, 
Levinson provides an elemental distillation of a religion of disillusion: 
1 The universe is indifferent to human existence and well-being; humans are neither the 
masters nor justification of the universe 
2 Morality, reason, and spirit are human artifacts and responsibilities 
3 Life has a narrative, ritual character that is nonreductively material and tradition-bound 
4 Goods are rooted in common human affects; there are no spiritual exceptions, no spiritual 
exceptionalism 
5 Disillusion religion fosters “imaginative practices of spiritualization that let people love life 
in the consciousness of impotence (giving the lie to any religion confessing belief that any 
power, human or otherwise, can make a new heaven and a new earth)”[Levinson 1992, 114]. 
We might call point number (1) a nonhuman-centered humanism. The perspective from which 
this judgment is made is necessarily human but there is no illusion that the universe is about us, 
that we are the culmination of evolutionary and cosmic processes. Taylor all but asserts that a 
nontranscendent perspective, by definition, must be only about human flourishing. But this claim 
merely reflects his assumptions and commitments. A similar judgment can be made regarding 
point number (2), the claim that a properly motivated ethical life must have a nonhuman 
reference. This is a perennial idea within the Platonic and Christian West that is captured 
powerfully, and for many convincingly, by the character Ivan in The Brothers Karamazov: “if 
there is no immortality of the soul, there can be no virtue and therefore everything is 
permissible” (Dostoyevsky 1970, 105). As a popular paraphrase puts it, “If there is no God, then 
everything is permitted.” Though Taylor's claim is not as extreme as Ivan's and does not imply 
the same nihilistic consequences, his argument regarding the necessity of a theistic source of 
ethics shares the same logic. 
That Taylor finds this logic compelling is evident in his claim that there is a gap between the 
phenomenology of secular humanism (its ethical universalism) and its immanent ontology. The 
ontology cannot properly motivate the phenomenology. I should note that Taylor does not argue 
this claim as much as assert it. The pragmatic naturalist can account for the force of moral claims 
without the kind of transcendent appeal that Taylor thinks is necessary. It is accurate to say that 
moral claims, phenomenologically speaking, strike us as true independently of certain contexts 
and perhaps, of human desires and standards altogether. They strike us as obvious and 
noncontroversially true. Thus we often react with incredulity, anger, and disgust toward those 
who do not acknowledge their truth. Such is our subjective relation to our moral claims. We 
might even say that the force and certainty of moral claims—for example, “the Rwandan 
genocide was wrong”—is cosmologically inscribed, constitutive of the very nature of things. We 
might say, further, that moral claims strike us as superhuman orantihuman, as divine 
commands—“Thus sayeth the Lord!” There is naïve realism in the way we experience moral 
claims. Pragmatic naturalists can account for this phenomenology within a naturalistic ontology, 
without adopting Taylor's transcendent perspective. 
Such an account might go something like this. Since the times of our paleolithic ancestors, we 
have told stories about our lives and the nature of our world. As myth-makers, we become who 
we are through the stories we tell and rituals we perform. These narratives and performances are 
essential aspects of our ongoing, sign-mediated social-creation. The traditions that enable and 
constrain us that give us breath and choke us are the products of our myth-making, performative, 
and practical activities. Life is stormy, perilous, and uncertain. Through ritual and ceremony, 
trial and error, we seek protection, relief, comfort, and joy. We imitate forms of beauty that we 
perceive in our environment and create forms of beauty that did not exist until we imagined 
them. All the goods that we have are rooted in the abundance and the scarcity of earth and sky—
those that are given to us by forces we might never fully comprehend, which come to us 
as gifts and tempt us to imagine that there is a person-like giver, and those that we invent. As 
sign-using social organisms, in a universe “perfused with signs” (Peirce 1998, 394), spirit is our 
capacity to go beyond our normal normality, to go deeply inside or to get outside of ourselves. 
This self-surpassing capacity is rooted, non-reductively and non-mechanistically, in our being-
organic. If humans (body/brain/mind) are artifacts of biological evolution, then spirit, a capacity 
of body/brain/mind, is a distal product of a multilevel evolutionary process. Spirit is mediated, 
amplified, and transformed by culture. Though the polarities of matter and spirit, body and mind, 
physical and mental are nominally distinct, they are not ontologically different. They are not dual 
realities or different kinds of “stuff,” as Descartes and contemporary dualists believe. These 
polarities are aspects of the same reality: the natural process. 
With this ontology in mind, naturalistic Christians claim that nature is the being of humans and 
gods, including the “one true god” and all the “false gods.” Imagining gods and entering various 
relations with them is a marvelous way, perhaps a miraculous way, of discovering our own 
capacities and expanding our world in indeterminate directions. (This is the cunning of the 
human sign-using imagination.) By imaging gods and complex relations among them, humans, 
and the cosmos, we reimagine and recreate our very being. Among the greatest characters ever 
created, the gods, including the Christian god, expand our aesthetic categories, which pass subtly 
into our ethics. Even as they stimulate and dignify our thoughts about the kind of life worth 
living, they inspire our speculative, engineering, and technological efforts. Through the gods we 
speak our own voice and hear it in ways we had not before (Santayana 1982).9 Through the gods, 
we hold a mirror before our own eyes, discovering what we might be at our very best, what we 
are at our genocidal worse, and what we can never be. Thus our god-filled narratives enable us, 
more effectively than do philosophical arguments and scientific analyses, to see just how good 
and evil we can be. Marx (2002, 73) and Richard Dawkins (2005, 28, 52) are wrong: as gifts that 
we give to ourselves, the gods enrich more than they impoverish (though we must acknowledge 
the sometimes poisoned nature of their gifts). 
Gods are the phenomenology of our deepest hopes and greatest fears, our darkest 
resentment and most heartfelt gratitude. They are the way that our best and worst 
qualities appear to us, as if they were objective, external, and other than us. By creating 
gods, we give our acts—of exalting and debasing, explaining and mystifying, rewarding 
and punishing, terrorizing and comforting—cosmic support [Hart, 2008]. 
By creating the gods—the one and the many, “one true god” and all the “false gods”—we 
enchant our world, give it charm, and discover its tragedy, sublimity, and magic. 
Though not enchanted in the traditional, “pre-reflective” way that Taylor attributes to premodern 
Christianity and apparently finds satisfying (though conceding that it is no longer possible) or in 
the reflected manner that he desires, the world of the naturalistic Christian is hardly 
disenchanted. An antidote to flat, gray boredom that Taylor attributes to enlightened modernity, 
the gods of the naturalistic imagination enchant us, bringing excitement, joy, and sorrow. As 
idealizations of the human condition, the gods, including the Christian god, poeticize and 
dramatize our existence through bawdy comedy, heart-wrenching tragedy, and romance all the 
way. With this understanding of Biblical narratives in view—where Jesus is the greatest 
character ever imagined within the greatest story ever told—we have the outline of a naturalistic 
Christian ethic. Lest there be any misunderstanding, I shall reiterate my claims. Christianity is 
merely one way of answering the question, “How shall I live?” It is a product of human culture 
in all of its semiotic complexity. Like every other god, the Christian god is an artifact of 
imagination. This god's ontology is imaginary. Just as spiders spin webs, bees make honey, and 
birds build nests, humans create gods. These acts of imagination are natural to human being. The 
Christian god is the god that Christians created. I suspect that this highly reflected creed, which 
relegates the gods and transcendent things to the sign-dependent powers of the human 
imagination, will not persuade neotraditionalists such as Taylor. It will leave them cold. For 
them, this account is probably a symptom of the dis-ease. 
5. Conclusion 
The orientation that I have described is something of a “high wire” act. Naturalistic Christianity 
is an elite formation, an acquired taste that requires considerable cultivation, and entails an ironic 
relation to the tradition. “Festive irony,” to coin a phrase, is the distance between an enthusiastic 
embrace of the ceremonies, rituals, and disciplines of a tradition combined with a cool 
skepticism, if not a satirical orientation toward its creedal, doctrinal, and dogmatic expressions. 
Naturalistic Christianity is a religion of “festive irony.” One engages fully in the ceremonial, 
ritual, and performative life of the tradition: dancing, singing, and shouting. One drinks deeply 
from its spiritual disciplines: prayer, scripture-reading, fasting, alms-giving, and meditation. But 
one's understanding of them is radically transformed by a disillusioned—again, not to be 
confused with disenchanted—festive irony. Through these spiritual disciplines, these 
technologies of the individual and corporate self, a naturalistic Christian engages in care and 
compassion. 
5.1 Last remarks 
All Things Shining: Reading the Western Classics to Find Meaning in a Secular Age (2011) 
by Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Dorrance Kelly(DK) may be the first book-length response to 
Taylor's A Secular Age.10 DK share Taylor's concern regarding the nihilism of the secular age: 
that it disenchants and flattens human life, draining any element of the sublime and the tragic, 
while coloring everything gray. Here is their diagnosis of the cause: 
Friedrich Nietzsche, the great German philosopher of the late nineteenth century, 
famously claimed that God is dead. What he meant by this is that we in the modern West 
no longer live in a culture where the basic questions of existence are already answered for 
us. The God of the Middle Ages played the role of answering existential questions before 
they could be asked; but such a role is no longer conceivable. This is true for modern 
religious believers and skeptics alike, as the contemporary philosopher Charles Taylor 
points out. Even if there is, as some have claimed, a Third Religious Awakening in the 
modern United States, the kind of religious belief available in our culture today is not 
sufficient to quell existential questioning. It is no longer taken for granted that 
nonbelievers are outside the realm of the human. This was the case in medieval 
Christendom: to be a nonbeliever was ipso facto to be evil, to have set yourself against 
the delights of all that is humanly worth attaining [Dreyfus and Kelly 2011, 20]. 
But for DK the problem is more acute than it is for Taylor. It is not just the case that modernity 
has made life flat, boring, and dull, largely bereft of the “shining things” that characterized the 
premodern West. Things may be worse than he thought. Using the writer David Foster Wallace 
as an exemplar, they paint a very dark picture of contemporary nihilism. Wallace committed 
suicide by hanging himself in 2008. Without making the claim baldly (they gesture toward the 
“neurophysiological and neurochemical aspects” of his depression), the implication of DK's 
account is that Wallace could not live the nihilism that he embraced. The metaphysical 
individualism that he thought his neo-Nietzschean views required him to affirm—which 
demanded that he, as an individual, create his own table of values, as if he were God, as if the 
world was devoid of value if he did not create it—was a burden he could not bear. And it was a 
burden DK argue that he did not need to assume. But he did assume Nietzsche's burden, and his 
tragic suicide is partially attributable to this mission impossible (Dreyfus and Kelly, 22–23, 42–
47, 49, 56–57). To say that his mission was impossible, however, is not to say that the Christian 
mission as Taylor conceives it is possible. DK do not believe that Christianity is the answer to 
the existential challenges of modernity. Jewish and Christian monotheisms,11 they suspect, 
cannot satisfy the needs of modern, post-Enlightenment, post-Nietzschean people for whom the 
“cat” of existential curiosity, questioning, and doubt is permanently “out of the bag” (Dreyfus 
and Kelly, 21). 
DK trace a rather different itinerary than does Taylor, moving from the Greece of Homer the 
poet to that of Aeschylus the tragedian, rather than through Plato the philosopher. Where 
Taylor's “axial metaphor” is a nonhuman, superhuman, if not antihuman notion of transcendence, 
DK retrieves the old Greek concept of physis. Physis is conventionally defined as the principle or 
source of growth, change, and develop in nature. Without rejecting the conventional definition, 
DK offer a somewhat different account: “The most important things, the most real things in 
Homer's world, well up and take us over, hold us for a while, and then, finally, let us go. If we 
had to translate Homer's word physis, then whooshing is about as close as we can get” (Dreyfus 
and Kelly, 200). According to DK, there are various occasions for such experiences in a secular 
age (sports is an exemplar but not the only possibility) where we undergo contagious forms of 
ecstasy, charisma, and effervescence that keep nihilism at bay without banishing it, and which 
ground our existence and make life worth living (Trotter 1919; Girard 1977; Reicher 
1982; Weber, 1978; and Durkheim 2008).12 In contrast to the traditions that Taylor describes as 
attempting to ground meaning and value in various notions of transcendence, DK offer a physis-
based notion: 
This situational notion of what grounds our existence, for example, is nothing like the 
eternal and everlasting kind of certainty and security that philosophers from Plato to 
Descartes to Kant desired. And it is nothing like the monotheistic, unified kind of 
certainty that the Judeo-Christian religions offer either. Rather, this pre-Axial kind of 
certainty is transient and multiple and it requires care. As Homer knows it carries you 
along for a while but it cannot last forever [Dreyfus and Kelly, 200].13 
On my reading, physis may be “superhuman” but that does not mean that it is “supernatural” or 
transcendent, in Taylor's sense of the term, rather than immanent. In this respect, I think that 
DK's views and my naturalistic Christian views converge. 
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Footnotes 
1. In a sense, Taylor is exploring the possibility of a second naïveté. 
2. See Loy 2002. 
3. I suspect that Taylor's use of this Heideggerian sounding language and all that it implies is 
intentional. 
4. This is not necessarily a critique. Anytime we engage in a comparative venture we are subject 
to the charge that our understanding of other traditions is parochial. This is the cost of doing this 
kind of scholarly business. 
5. Of course, these traditions are human-all-too-human. As such, they are full of a great deal of 
nonsense as well. So it is also accurate to refer to them as “folly traditions.” 
6. Just to be clear, I object to the reductive features of these accounts. My objection is not to the 
basic orientations of these accounts. 
7. Panexperientialism is an idea associated with the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. 
However, the term was coined by David Ray Griffin. Protopanexperientialism is a qualification 
of Griffin's view. 
8. I first encountered James's comment in Kim 1999. 
9. Prayer is one of the ways that we talk to ourselves by speaking to the gods. Santayana 
famously remarks: “Prayer is a soliloquy; but being a soliloquy expressing need, and being 
furthermore, like sacrifice, a desperate expedient which men fly to in their impotence, it looks for 
an effect: to cry aloud, to make vows, to contrast eloquently the given with the ideal situation, is 
certainly as likely a way of bringing about a change for the better as it would be to chastise one's 
self severely, or to destroy what one loves best, or to perform acts altogether trivial and arbitrary. 
Prayer also is magic, and as such it is expected to do work. The answer looked for, or one which 
may be accepted instead, very often ensues; and it is then that mythology begins to enter in and 
seeks to explain by what machinery of divine passions and purposes that answering effect was 
produced.” And, he adds: “The mythology that pretends to justify prayer by giving it a material 
efficacy misunderstands prayer completely and makes it ridiculous, for it turns away from the 
heart, which prayer expresses pathetically, to a fabulous cosmos where aspirations have been 
turned into things and have thereby stifled their own voices” (available 
at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/15000/15000-h/vol3.html#Page_28). 
10. As Dreyfus and Kelly indicate in “Acknowledgment,” the book developed in part as a result 
of their participation in a seminar on A Secular Age at Harvard in 2009. 
11. They do not mention Islam. Presumably their doubts about Judaism and Christianity are 
applicable to Islam as well. 
12. Steve Reicher is the contrarian among this group. 
13. I should note that religion scholars regard the concept of “Judeo-Christian” as dubious. 
 
